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Theorizing about the Self in 
Panpsychism and the Extended 
Mind Using the Dao De Jing  
(道德經) and Zhuangzi (莊子) 
 
By Ryan Lemasters 
 
ABSTRACT: In this paper, I begin by briefly showing how the 
problem of self has been understood and approached historically in 
Western philosophy. I follow this by focusing on some of the recent 
literature in the philosophy of mind that suggests that the self is 
extended, meaning it is not solely located within the boundaries of 
the brain (Clark and Chalmers 1998). It will be evident that this is 
in conflict with the traditional Western understanding of the self. 
Since it seems to be the case that there are strong arguments for 
endorsing the view that the self is extended (to some degree), we 
ought to give the proper philosophical attention to such views, and 
using Daoist ideas will help to theorize about these unorthodox 
views. This will be the focus of the remainder of the paper, pulling 
primarily from the Dao De Jing (道德經) and Zhuangzi (莊子). It 
will be shown that some of these unorthodox views arising from the 
philosophy of mind bear a close connection to certain Daoist ideas, 
therefore making it likely that they share common conceptual 
resources. I will conclude with some possible objections and 
responses to those objections. Ultimately, if the self is indeed 
extended, then this is unfamiliar to the Western mind. However, 
analyzing these unorthodox views using Daoist ideas may be a 










 Recent literature produced in the philosophy of mind has been met with 
skepticism. Panpsychism and the extended mind thesis are two views that fall into 
this category. Grasping these theories from the perspective of Western philosophy 
is difficult because they run counter to traditional Western notions of cognition, 
consciousness, and the self. However, taking a more Eastern approach and 
grounding these views in Daoist ideas provides a bridge for theorizing about 
panpsychism and the extended mind thesis. In this paper, I begin by briefly showing 
how the problem of self has been understood and approached historically in 
Western philosophy. I follow this by focusing on some of the recent literature that 
suggests that the self is extended, meaning it is not solely located within the 
boundaries of the body. It will be evident that this is in conflict with the traditional 
Western understanding of the self. Since it seems to be the case that there are strong 
arguments for endorsing the view that the self is extended, we ought to give the 
proper philosophical attention to such views, and, as I argue, using Daoist ideas 
will help us theorize about these unorthodox views. This will be the focus of the 
remainder of the paper, where I pull primarily from the Dao De Jing (道德經) and 
Zhuangzi (莊子). It will be shown that some of these recent, unorthodox views in 
the philosophy of mind bear a close connection to certain Daoist ideas, suggesting 
that they share common conceptual resources. I will conclude with some possible 
objections and responses to those objections. Ultimately, if the self is indeed 
extended, then this is unfamiliar to the Western mind. However, analyzing these 
unorthodox views using Daoist ideas may be a suitable tool in progressing our 
understanding of the self. 
 
Traditional Western Views of Self105 
 
The problem of personal identity is multifaceted in that it concerns 
metaphysics, biology, and certainly many other areas. I take it to be the case that 
the most prominent aspect of the problem is the spatiotemporal boundaries of the 
self. This problem has a long history in the West. It has been pursued by many of 
the most influential philosophers, such as John Locke, David Hume, Gottfried 
Leibniz, Joseph Butler, and Thomas Reid106. The philosophical nature to the 
question of what is a self is familiar to everyone when we reflect on our own 
experiences. People claim ownership to their physical body because they believe 
                                                          
105 “Traditional Western Views” should not be understood as a characterization of (all) Western 
Philosophy. I am simply using this category to draw out some key features that have been prominent 
in Western Philosophy regarding the self.  




that their body is different from the body of another person. People also believe that 
they are the sole owner of their mind. It belongs to the person and no one else has 
the ability to occupy his or her mind. Common reflections like these have prompted 
philosophical inquiry into the relationship between the body and mind. Is it the case 
that the mind makes up the self, or does the body make up the self? Furthermore, 
how does the self exist from one point in time to another point in time? This is the 
problem of persistence. 
 
The persistence question is often taken to ask what it takes for the same 
person to exist at two different times. The most common formulation is 
something like this: If a person x exists at one time and a person y exists at 
another time, under what possible circumstances is it the case that x is y? 
(Olsen, 2017). 
 
When I see a photograph of myself from when I was two years old, I point to the 
photo and say, “That is me!” The persistence problem addresses the justification 
(or lack of) for why two-year-old Ryan is the same person as adult Ryan. Fleshing 
this out further, the bodies are completely different. The child in the photo is very 
small and lacks mature physical characteristics compared to the developed adult 
body exemplified in present-day Ryan. It is a similar story when it comes to the 
mind. Child Ryan has not developed cognitive processes that are present in adult 
Ryan. Furthermore, the access to memories is very different because adult Ryan 
possesses many more. Intuitively, it seems that child Ryan and adult Ryan are of 
the same self. However, this is not necessarily the case, and many contemporary 
Western philosophers have developed competing theories with disparate 
conclusions. Sydney Shoemaker and Richard Swinburne capture the focus of the 
problem. 
 
There are two philosophical questions about personal identity. The first is: 
what are the logically necessary and sufficient conditions for a person P2 at 
a time, t2 being the same person as a person P1 at an earlier time t1, or 
loosely, what does it mean to say that P2 is the same person as P1? The 
second is: what evidence of observation and experience can we have that a 
person P2 at t2 is the same person as a person P1 at t1 (and how are different 
pieces of evidence to be weighed against each other)? (1984) 
 
I will outline two popular theories that have been used to respond to the problem of 






Simple and Complex View 
 
The influence of Cartesian dualism on the Western academy has been 
prominent. This paper specifically shows the influence it has had on spatiotemporal 
boundaries of the self 107. Monotheistic religions, and also some Eastern religions, 
hold a metaphysically dualist position. In the context of personal identity, the 
Simple View takes a similar metaphysical position. This is why many of the 
defenders of the Simple View hold religious beliefs. “The proponent of the Simple 
View of personal identity will say that personal identity is an ultimate unanalyzable 
fact” and “persons are ‘separately existing’ entities, distinct from their brains, 
bodies, and experiences” (Noonan, 2003, pp. 95-96). Arguments that defend this 
theory are found in Shoemaker and Swinburne (1984). Ultimately, the self is 
fundamentally identified as the soul or some immaterial substance. A competing 
position to the Simple View is the Complex View. This view claims that the self is 
identifiable by an individual’s brain, body, and experiences. 
 
A proponent of the Complex View will maintain that an informative account 
of what personal identity consists in is possible, since personal identity is 
nothing over and above those observable and introspectable facts of 
physical and psychological continuity which provide the only evidence for 
it. (Noonan, 2003, pp. 95-96) 
 
Both the Simple View and Complex View are within the scope of Traditional 
Western Views, because both approaches understand the self as fixed in space and 
time. From the spatial perspective, the claim is that the self is just one thing, and it 
can only occupy one space. For the Simple View it is some immaterial substance, 
and for the Complex View it is some combination of material substances. From the 
temporal perspective, they claim that the self has a fixed temporal structure. The 
issue can be understood through the question of whether the self endures or 
perdures through time.  
Endurantism is a theory sometimes referred to as three-dimensionalism. For 
a self to endure means that a self exists wholly at each time that it exists. In other 
words, a self does not have any temporal parts. Take the case where person X exists 
at time t1. X would exist entirely at t1. Then take time t2. If X exists at t2, then X 
                                                          
107 Rene Descartes’ investigation into what an individual can know for certain is explicated in his 
Meditations. Though most modern-day philosophers would not agree with his conclusions, the 
metaphysical questions he raises remain philosophically important. Descartes’ analytic argument 
explaining the nature of reality supports my claim that Descartes cannot be ignored. He calls into 
question the idea that matter is all that exists. This is portrayed by his deconstructive methodology. 
He concludes with the metaphysical position that there are two kinds of stuff: material and non-
material, captured by the term Cartesian Dualism. 
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existed entirely at t1, and then entirely at t2. Perdurantism is the theory that is 
sometimes referred to as four-dimensionalism, the fourth dimension referring to 
time. To claim that the self perdures means that the self persists through time by a 
specific temporal part existing whenever the self exists. In other words, if a self 
persists through time it will never exist entirely from time t1 to time t2 because the 
amount of temporal parts will be different. It is not the object of this analysis to 
settle the issue on which theory is correct. The point I am trying to make is that 
temporal structure is a major factor in understanding the self, and from the 
description I have provided, it seems to imply that the self has temporal boundaries. 
I will conclude this section by reiterating that Traditional Western Views are 
committed to the position that the self is fixed in time and space, and that there are 




I will now present two contemporary Western ideas of self. I give a brief 
overview of each, highlighting key features. I label these contemporary Western 
views as the Unorthodox Views because they have been met with much skepticism, 
especially from proponents of the Traditional Western View.  
 It is common to address the idea of self by exploring consciousness. 
Consciousness is something that every human is familiar with. We intimately know 
it without having a clear understanding of what it actually is. Consciousness is not 
something we can forget to have. It is always with us. Even when we think about 
times where consciousness is not fully activated, like while dreaming, there is still 
some phenomenal experience of what it is like to be in that state. The first 
Unorthodox View I will discuss is panpsychism. “The word ‘panpsychism’ literally 
means that everything has a mind. However, in contemporary debates it is generally 
understood as the view that mentality is fundamental and ubiquitous in the natural 
world” (Goff, Seager, & Allen-Hermanson, 2017). There are a variety of theories 
that fall into the panpsychism camp. I am using panpsychism as meaning “that 
mentality is distributed throughout the natural world—in the sense that all material 
objects have parts with mental properties” (Goff et al, 2017). Panpsychists are not 
committed to the claim that the Empire State Building, a rock, and chairs are 
conscious like humans. It seems that they are committed to the thesis that there is a 
fundamental nature to physical things, namely consciousness. The idea is that 
everything in the universe has a mental state in which there is something it is like 
to be in that state. If panpsychism is right, then physical entities in the universe are 
conscious, and that implies “that there is something it is like to be a quark or a 
photon or a member of some other fundamental physical type,” even if the degree 
of consciousness is minimal (Chalmers, 2017). Though this view is sometimes 
dismissed outright as being crazy, this objection alone does not have any merit.  
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 The second Unorthodox View that I will discuss is embodied cognition. The 
endorsement of embodied cognition has gained momentum in recent literature in 
the philosophy of mind and in the field of cognitive science108. Several 
contemporary scholars, such as David Chalmers, Andy Clark, Alva Noë, Lawrence 
Shapiro, Anil Seth, Evan Thompson, and David Vernon, have given attention to 
this matter, but the seminal work for thinking about embodiment comes from “The 
Extended Mind” (Clark and Chalmers, 1998).  
  Clark and Chalmers (1998) argue that cognition extends into the world. To 
support this claim, they focus on “beliefs embedded in memory,” using the thought 
experiment Inga and Otto to convince you that “when it comes to belief, there is 
nothing sacred about skull and skin” (pp. 10-23). Clark and Chalmers thought 
experiment can be summarized as follows. Inga hears about an event going on at 
the Museum of Modern Art and wants to attend. She thinks for a moment and 
remembers that the museum is located on 53rd street. She proceeds to the museum 
on foot. It is clear that Inga had the belief that the museum is located on 53rd street 
before she recalled it from her memory. It became an occurrent belief but 
previously (before she recalled it from memory) it was not. Now consider Otto who 
suffers from Alzheimer’s disease. It is common for people that suffer from this 
disease to rely heavily on information in the environment to help bring coherence 
and structure to their life. Otto is not unique in this respect. He relies on his 
notebook, which he carries around everywhere, in order to bring structure to his 
life. When he receives new information, he writes it in his notebook. In fact, this 
book plays the role of a biological memory. When Otto hears from a friend about 
an event occurring at the museum, he consults his notebook which indicates that it 
is located on 53rd street. He proceeds to the museum (1998, pp. 10-23). Clark and 
Chalmers believe that if the cases for Inga and Otto are analogous, it follows that 
the mind extends into the environment. However, resistance to this conclusion takes 
the following forms: the usage of belief in this case is incorrect, information is just 
in the head, and the access and reliability between Otto and Inga is different. Clark 
and Chalmers respond to this opposition by arguing that even when differences 
occur, “these various small differences between Otto’s case and Inga’s case are 
                                                          
108 From the analysis of the Traditional Western View, it is clear that cognition is a prominent factor 
when making sense of the self. For example, scholars that endorse the Complex View may claim 
that the persistence of the brain is all we need for the persistence of the self. With that said, the 
recent literature in cognition has shifted away from the thesis that cognition takes place solely inside 
the skull. David Marr (1982) is partly responsible for this traditional perspective because of the 
monumental work he did in perception. Marr argues for computationalism, a view that says 
perception is representational and algorithmic. Although this idea precedes Marr, his work has 
inspired contemporary progress in the development of artificial intelligence. Ultimately, 
computationalism reduces human experience to an algorithm that can be uploaded into a machine. 
This makes strong artificial intelligence plausible. The unsettling conclusions of this view have 
allowed for alternative theories of cognition to flourish. 
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shallow differences” (pp. 10-23). At the very least, Clark and Chalmers show that 
the extended mind thesis should be taken seriously, and it is worth further 
philosophical attention. If dispositional beliefs are a major factor in our identity as 
cognitive agents, like Traditional Western Views hold, then the self is extended into 
the environment. In other words, if we think of the mind as being intimately 
connected with the self, and we accept Clark and Chalmers’ thesis that the mind is 
extended, it follows that the self is also extended.  
The Traditional Western Views and the Unorthodox Views I have outlined 
above are so disparate that it is nonsensical to try to understand one using the 
framework of the other. Because the Traditional Views predate the Unorthodox 
Views and have elicited so much philosophical attention, the Unorthodox Views, 
coming later and conflicting with the earlier views, are seen as controversial, and 
many are skeptical about their plausibility. It will be shown that some of these 
Unorthodox Views arising from the philosophy of mind bear a close connection to 
certain Daoist ideas, suggesting that the two share common conceptual resources. 
In the remainder of this paper, I argue that a focus on certain Daoist ideas may be 




One reason why Traditional Western Views of the self are perhaps not an 
appropriate lens to use for understanding the Unorthodox Views is because the 
former requires necessary and sufficient conditions for defining the self, while the 
conditions remain unclear in the latter views. The Daoist perspective does not make 
use of these conditions either, which makes it a more suitable framework to use for 
comparative analysis in order to understand the Unorthodox Views. This becomes 
evident when understanding Daoist metaphysics and its view on change as 
fluctuation and alteration as opposed to substantive change. In Daoist texts, the self 
is described as being vast, extended, transformative, and having the potential to be 
formless. I will now turn to specific examples within the text and abstract the key 
features to clarify the Daoist notion of the self.  
 Transforming occurs in the Dao De Jing and the Zhuangzi. This should be 
understood as part of a process. Just as it is the case that Daoists think of change as 
more of alteration and fluctuation than cause and effect, this idea applies to the idea 
of the self transforming as well. In many cases it is the result of a meditative 
practice. Ultimately, transforming supports the importance of meditation practice 
within Daoism. The Dao De Jing and Zhuangzi provide “Several passages [that] 
seem to refer to meditation practice” (Allen, 2014, p. 257). Ames and Hall (2003) 
goes as far as claiming that the “Daodejing can be read as metaphor for breathing 
exercises” (p. 90). Breathing exercises are a form of meditation. This practice is 
important to my investigation of the self because through this practice, according 
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to Daoist texts, it is possible to transform the self. “Tzû-ch’i of Nan-kuo reclined 
elbow on armrest, looked up at the sky and exhaled, in a trance as though he had 
lost the counterpart of himself” (Graham, 2001, p. 48). This example suggests that 
Tzû-ch’’'s breath provided a transformative experience in which his self was 
transformed. The use of the word “counterpart” here would seem to suggest that his 
self is located in two different places, one being the armchair and the other being 
located in a different space. The possibility of the occurrence of losing a counterpart 
of one’s self, and not one’s whole self, is evidence that the self is extended in space.  
We also find in Daoist texts examples of cognition as being extended. 
Again, this is possible through meditation. “Allow your ears and eyes to open 
inward and thereby place yourself beyond your mind’s understanding 
consciousness” (Ziporyn, p. 27). The term “understanding consciousness” is 
translated from the Chinese知Zhi. The term “means the faculty of cognition in 
general” and it can also mean “consciousness in the sense of sentience or awareness 
as such” (Ziporyn, p. 219). Considering this example and understanding the 
Chinese concept of zhi suggests that Daoism allows for the possibility of cognition 
to be extended into the world, thereby not only occurring within the brain or skull. 
Yan Hui tells Confucius in the Zhunagzi (2009) that he sits and forgets. Yan Hui’s 
description of his experience provides an example of physical transformation worth 
exploring within our investigation of the self. 
 
‘It’s a dropping away of my limbs and torso, a chasing off of my sensory 
acuity, which disperses my physical form and outs my understanding until 
I am the same as the Transforming Openness. This is what I call just sitting 
and forgetting.’ Confucius said, ‘the same as it? But then you are free of all 
preference! Transforming? But then you are free of all constancy! You truly 
are a worthy man! I beg to be accepted as your disciple.’ (p. 49)  
 
Yan Hui undergoes the process of deconstructing himself. He identifies different 
components of himself by bringing awareness to his body and detaching from it. 
He continues this process of detachment from his sensory experiences. He 
ultimately reaches a state where he is outside of form. This idea of the formless is 
familiar in Daoism. 
 
“One”—there is nothing more encompassing above it, 
And nothing smaller below it. 
Boundless, formless! It cannot be names, 
And returns to the state of no-thing. 




In this context, another word for One is Dao (道). This passage from the Dao De 
Jing refers to Dao and more specifically Dao-ing. Dao-ing, according to the 
commentary from Ames and Hall (2003), “will not yield itself up to our most basic 
categories of location and determination” (p. 97). This means that Dao has no 
physical boundaries. Therefore, Dao is formless. However, it is also form. This 
apparent contradiction needs further attention. Daoist metaphysics seeks to justify 
why this should not be considered a contradiction. To claim that it is difficult to 
find a consistent metaphysical position within the early Daoist texts is an 
understatement. Brian Bruya acknowledges that “there are many lacunae with 
respect to our understanding of explicit and implicit cosmologies of Laozi and 
Zhuangzi, one thing seems certain: that there is no metaphysical break between 
human and animal or human and spiritual” (p. 213). Daoist philosophy does not 
make a distinction between what is artificial and natural or the divine realm and 
human realm. They believe that everything is natural and a constituent of nature. 
 
The Way gave birth to the One; 
The One gave birth to the Two; 
The Two gave birth to the Three; 
And the Three gave birth to the ten thousand things. 
The ten thousand things carry Yin on their backs and wrap their arms around 
Yang. 
Through the blending of ch’i they arrive at a state of harmony. (Henricks, 
1989, p. 11) 
 
This chapter represents the oneness of all things. All things in the universe are 
fundamentally Dao. “Daoism construes oneness and manyness as interdependent 
ways of looking at the process of experience” (Ames and Hall, p 142). Daoism does 
not make the distinction between One, Two, or the many as indicated in the 
Zhuangzi when it says that “Heaven and earth are born together with me, and the 
ten thousand things and I are one” (Ziporyn, p. 15). This metaphysical position, 
therefore, nullifies the above apparent contradiction of form and formless. It also 
provides insight into the plausibility of Yan Hui’s transformation from sitting and 
forgetting because if everything is One, the detachment from physical components 
of the body will not destroy the self, thereby suggesting that the self extends beyond 




 In order to elaborate on the transformative nature of the self in Daoism, it is 
helpful to think about the experience of death, especially because there is textual 
insight on this matter. When the flow of life (sheng or生) perishes, is that the end 
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of the existence of our self? Within the Daosit perspective, this does not seem to be 
the case. It has already been explained that Daoist metaphysics consist of one thing 
and not two, so for a self to perish throughout the transformative experience of 
death seems inaccurate. To even begin to understand death of the self from the 
Daoist perspective, it seems that we must release our traditional conception of what 
it means to die and adopt the view that death is just another transformative 
experience. It is for this reason that Daoists do not conceive of death as a negative 
event. Just as it is the case that we are ignorant of our existence before we 
transformed into our current life, we are also ignorant of the transformation we will 
undergo in the next. “Having already transformed into some particular being, he 
takes it as no more than a waiting for the next transformation into the unknown, 
nothing more” (Ziporyn, p. 47). This conception of death is different from 
Traditional Western Views, where the problem of persistence focuses on whether 
or not the same self persists over time. In Daoism, this is a non-issue. It is not 
relevant to the notion of the self to consider it as persisting over time, but rather 
how it is identified in this transformative process. It remains unclear if the 
Unorthodox Views of panpsychism and extended mind need to answer the problem 
of persistence. This could support my claim that they share a conceptual 
framework. If this is the case, it would seem that the Daoist perspective is a more 
appropriate lens than the Traditional Western views for further analyzing the 
Unorthodox Views. 
 
‘Ugh!’ The maker of things still goes on turning me into this crumpled 
thing.’ ‘Do you hate it?’ ‘No, why should I hate it? Little by little he’ll 
borrow my left arm to transform it into a cock, and it will be why I am 
listening to a cock-crow at dawn. Little by little he’ll borrow my right arm 
to transform it into a crossbow, and it will be why I am waiting for a roasted 
owl for my dinner. (Graham, p. 88)  
 
In this example, Master Yu is explaining to Master Ssu that whatever 
transformation may come, he will identify that thing as his self. Master Yu makes 
no value judgment on which form is preferred. He seems to recognize the reality of 
“the transformation of all things” and this should be understood as including the 




Introducing the Chinese interpretation of transcendence is another way of 
investigating the concept of the self, especially as it pertains to what happens to the 
self during death and while taking up multiple perspectives. Because various 
ideological movements have used disparate concepts of transcendence in their 
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worldviews, the term has become ambiguous (Barrett, 2011). The Chinese 
connotation with respect to transcendence takes a naturalist form. In the West, 
Christianity heavily influences the way people conceive of transcendence. In this 
context, when a person dies, a self transcends (goes beyond) the human realm to a 
divine realm. This contrasts with the Chinese understanding, which posits that there 
is no other realm than the human realm. Therefore, to transcend the self is to go 
beyond your current self, but it does not mean to transcend nature or Dao. This is 
consistent with the Daoist view that metaphysics consists of One, not Two. Another 
way to understand transcendence as it applies to the self is to analyze this idea of 
the existence of multiple perspectives. In the West, people’s perspective is their 
own. When someone tries to take up another person’s perspective they do so from 
their own perceptive. It is not the case that they completely lose their perspective 
and adopt an entirely new one. This subtle distinction is important because there 
are examples in the Daoist texts that seem to imply the possibility of completely 
adopting a new perspective, and this ultimately supports the notion of the self as 
being extended, transformative, and vast.  
 
‘This’ is also a ‘that.’ ‘That’ is also a ‘this.’ ‘THAT’ posits a ‘this’ and a 
‘that’—a right and a wrong—of its own. But ‘THIS’ also posits a ‘this’ and 
a ‘that,’ –a right and wrong –of its own. So is there really any ‘that’ versus 
‘this,’ any right versus wrong? Or is there really no ‘that’ versus ‘this’? 
When ‘this’ and ‘that’ –right and wrong—are no longer coupled as 
opposites—that is called the Course as Axis, the axis of course. (Ziporyn, 
2009, p. 12) 
 
Daoism explicitly argues for the existence of multiple perspectives within the 
universe, which this passage illustrates. People perceive something from their own 
perspective or their “this,” but with every “this” there is a “that.” There is further 
textual support when considering multiple perspectives in altered states such as 
dreams 
 
You temporarily get involved in something or other and proceed to call it 
myself –but how can we know if what we call ‘self’ has any ‘self’ to it? You 
dream you are a bird and find yourself soaring in the heavens, you dream 
you are a fish and find yourself submerged in the depths. I cannot even know 
if what I’m saying now is a dream or not. (Ziporyn, p.48) 
 
A third example of the idea of multiple perspectives in Daoist text is displayed in 




Once Zhuang Zhou dreamt he was a butterfly, fluttering about joyfully just 
as a butterfly would. He followed his whims exactly as he liked and knew 
nothing about Zhuang Zhou. Suddenly he awoke, and there he was, the 
startled Zhuang Zhou in the flesh. He did not know if Zhou had been 
dreaming he was a butterfly, or if a butterfly was now dreaming it was Zhou. 
Surely, Zhou and a butterfly count as two distinct identities! Such is what 
we call the transformation of one thing into another. (Ziporyn, 2009, p.21)  
 
This example is in partial agreement with some of the ideas described in the 
Unorthodox Views because it implies that cognition is extended into the 
environment. However, these examples demonstrate how people can take multiple 
perspectives a step further by suggesting that it is possible to literally take up the 
perspective of other creatures. The word perspective has a Latin root that means 
“look through.” To have a perspective implies that some form of perception is 
occurring. If perception is occurring, then this is a form of cognition. Therefore, 
Daoist thought is claiming that cognition is extended into the world. Furthermore, 
these examples imply just how vast the nature of the self should be understood 




The term “qi” can be translated as vital energy, energy, or matter. It is the 
Daoist belief that qi is the essence of everything in the universe. Daoism takes qi to 
be everywhere and in all things. It can also be translated as breath or life force.  
 
It was originally taken as one kind of stuff, connected with air and breath, 
but it eventually became the dominant label for the basic stuff of the world, 
used to explain all kinds of dynamic processes, from the formation of 
heaven and earth to the patterns of weather to the processes of the human 
heart. It was closely connected with life and the generative power of nature. 
(Perkins, 2016) 
 
Qi is used often in both the ancient literature and contemporary Daoist literature. In 
many cases it is used in the context of longevity. By circulating qi it “enable[s] us 
to maximize our potency and invigorate our minds” (Ames, 2003, p. 90). However, 
some scholars have developed different interpretations of this concept. Brian Bruya 
(adopted from Jane Geaney) characterizes an early Chinese perspective of qi that is 
slightly different from the previous description. 
 
A human being receives information about the external world not only 
through the five senses but also through the perception of the flowing of qi, 
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which carries information (to varying degrees depending on the subject, the 
object, and the circumstance) concerning the fluctuating interior conditions 
of a thing, a person, a place, a group, or a situation in general. (p. 213) 
 
Perception deals with information. This example gives an alternative to the idea 
that information is only accessed through our senses. According to this 
interpretation, there is an association between qi and information. The Daoist belief 
is that qi is ubiquitous. If qi can be reduced to information, then information is also 
ubiquitous. If this is indeed the case, this provides insight for theorizing 
meaningfully about the Unorthodox Views such as, in a certain context, one form 
of panpsychism called Integrated Information Theory that is represented in the 
work of Guilio Tononi (2012). The main point here is not the specifics of Tononi’s 
view, but an awareness of the fact that some of the Unorthodox Views, such as 
Tononi’s believe information is essential to understanding consciousness and the 
self. The accumulation and manipulation of qi might be a way of theorizing about 
how the structure of information gives rise to consciousness.  
 
Objections and Replies 
 
I acknowledge that there could be potential objections to this paper. First, 
one could say that it is a mistake to conflate the Simple View and Complex View 
into the Traditional Western Views. I agree that these two views amount to very 
different positions. However, the main purpose for my categorization was to show 
that there is contrasting methodological approaches to the notion of the self between 
the Traditional Western Views and the Unorthodox Views. One major difference 
in approach lies with the extension of the self. The Traditional Western Views think 
it is fixed and the Unorthodox Views think it is extended. Therefore, the approach 
is completely different when considering the spatiotemporal boundaries.  
Another objection I foresee is that my conception of qi is misguided. This 
does not seem to amount to much because the main point of that analysis was to 
identify the connection between qi and information. Once that connection is made, 
the ground for philosophical exploration into consciousness becomes fruitful. We 
see support of this from the possibility of manipulating or combining qi in order to 
have a different form of consciousness. 
Finally, it is a valid criticism to suggest that I am construing panpsychism 
and the extended mind thesis as more similar than they actually are. I recognize that 
these two theories have similarities but amount to very different positions. An 
adequate development of these two theories lies outside the scope of this paper. 
However, if it is acknowledged that these two views fundamentally contrast the 
way I characterized the Traditional Western Views, then it is reasonable to suggest 
that using Daoist ideas is a meaningful way to theorize about these Unorthodox 
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Views. Therefore, even if the particular Daoist ideas of the self being vast, 
extended, and transformative do not apply entirely to panpsychism or the extended 




Starting with the analysis of Traditional Western Views, it was shown that 
the self is conceived of as fixed in time and space. When this is the case, problems 
such as the persistence of the self occurs. Recent literature in the philosophy of 
mind and cognitive sciences have called into question traditional views concerning 
cognition, consciousness, and self. In this paper, I have not tried to resolve all the 
skepticism towards the Unorthodox Views. I have instead extracted key ideas from 
the primary texts of Daoism to show that the self can be understood as vast, 
extended, transformative, and has the potential to be formless, which I claim helps 
us theorize about Unorthodox Views.  
  From the Daoist perspective, theories or ideas that are considered in the 
Unorthodox Views are far from radical or crazy. It may be the case that a Daoist 
would endorse such views. The Daoist ideas that I have presented in this paper 
should specifically give structure to theorizing about panpsychism and the extended 
mind thesis because of the shared conceptual resources. Although my approach 
uses Daoist ideas to help bridge the conceptual gap between the traditional and the 
more radical views of self in the West, I see no reason for this approach to be 
exclusive. We could use the ideas of the Unorthodox Views to theorize about Daoist 
ideas. Ultimately, if we want to resolve fundamental problems with the self that the 
Traditional View has been stuck on for centuries, we should consider endorsing the 
Unorthodox Views. Since theories within the category of Unorthodox Views are in 
the infant stages, compared to those encompassed by the Traditional View, it is 
difficult to theorize about them. Therefore, it is difficult to advance these views. 
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